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PRINCIPLES OF ICONICITY 
AND LINGUISTIC CATEGORIES
Autonomy is death. Pattern coherence is required for life. 
(Kenneth Pike)
1. Preliminaries
In most general terms, iconicity is defi ned as form miming meaning and/or 
form, or as meaning miming form – both in language and in literature.1 Th e 
following discussion will focus upon certain manifestations of this relationship 
between form and meaning in the system of natural language and in language 
use. From the linguistic point of view, the form will then be naturally under-
stood as the phonetic or graphic “shape” of linguistic signs on diff erent levels 
of structural organization. 
Basic defi nitions of iconicity, as well as its basic descriptions and proposed 
taxonomies, are generally recognized and accepted. What is less readily real-
ized, however, is the double nature of the relationship: the “miming” is to be 
seen as either a refl ection or a creation of a similarity and, in consequence, the 
similarity that underlies the iconic relationship can be either recognized or cre-
ated. Th e diff erence between these two aspects of iconicity is signifi cant for 
linguistic study, as it underlies the two general oppositions that condition the 
development of natural language: motivation as opposed to arbitrariness of lin-
guistic signs, and conventionalization as opposed to innovation in language use. 
“Miming” implies comparing, the cognitive operation recognized as one of 
the most basic and most universal activities of human mind; it underlies the 
process that Aristotle described as mimesis, and in her inventory of semantic 
1 See http://www2.rikkyo.ac.jp /web/iconicity/.
.
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primes Wierzbicka (1996) lists the items LIKE/WAY as primes that represent 
the category SIMILARITY (cf. also Goddard 2002). Unlike in Aristotle, in 
modern cognitive science, and in cognitive linguistics in particular, similarity 
is considered to be intrinsically subjective. In order to come into existence, the 
relationship of similarity between entities has to be noticed; in other words, it 
needs an observer: Hegel’s phenomenologist observing reason, or Peirce’s semi-
otic interpretant. In this sense, the relation of similarity that holds between two 
entities is not tantamount to the relation defi ned in logic as equivalence – the 
relation that is symmetrical: (A ~ B  B ~ A), refl exive (A ~ A) and transitive 
(A ~ B and B ~ C  A ~ C). Unlike equivalence, the relation of similarity as 
a function of an “observing reason” is never complete, that is, it is perceived 
as compatibility of a certain number of shared features. Th e metonymy is re-
fl ected in dictionary explanations, which defi ne the adjective “similar” as “of 
the same nature or kind.”
As diff erent from formal logic reasoning, in natural language communica-
tion similarity is intrinsically metonymic, with the selection of features being 
motivated by what in Ronald Langacker’s theory of language is defi ned as sa-
lience, whereby feature(s) that the “observing reason” considers to be the most 
salient become(s) the means to mentally access an object, which is chosen for 
reference in either physical (concrete) or mental (abstract) space. Because of its 
subjective nature, the relation is context dependent: it is shaped according to 
the observer’s particular point of view or perspective from which the entities in 
question are being observed. Th is type of context dependence relates to what 
in terms of visual perception of objects situated in physical three-dimensional 
space is defi ned as projection aspects (cf. Arnheim 1997 [1954]). In visual per-
ception, depending on the particular point of view, the observer perceives an 
entity in a particular confi guration, so that only some of its features can be seen 
(i.e., appear as salient) while others remain hidden from view (i.e., are not con-
sciously perceived). Extended to mental perception of entities located in men-
tal spaces, the context dependence conditioning particular choices of projec-
tion aspects means understanding similarity as being prompted by the nature 
of Husserl’s sociocultural lifeworld, the social intersubjective reality of “natural” 
intercourse of people (cf. Husserl 1970 [1936]). Within this phenomenological 
framework the relationship of similarity is seen as subject to experiential (epis-
temic) objectivism, whereby perceiving things involves cooperation between 
properties of the object of perception and the nature of the perceiving subject. 
Th erefore, ultimately, as a relationship that holds between entities, similarity 
exists in the eye (or in the mind) of the beholder and is (inter)subjectively per-
ceived in the process of comparison.
Th e assumptions that underlie our discussion of iconicity as refl ected in 
grammatical categories and the use of a natural language is neatly summarized 
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by the following quotation, taken from a text appropriately titled “Th e ecologi-
cal foundations of iconicity”:
It is a basic property of the Lifeworld that everything in it is given in a subjective-
relative manner. Th is means, for example, that a thing of any kind will always be 
perceived from a certain point of view, in a perspective that lets a part of the object 
form the centre of attention. What is perceived is the object, though it is always 
given through one or more of its perspectives […]. To Husserl, this seeing of the 
whole in one of its parts is related to the etc. principle, our knowledge of being able, 
at any one point, to turn the dice over, or go round it, to look at the other sides 
(Sonesson: online).
2. Interim conclusions
As discussed in Section 1 above, the precondition for iconicity is an observer’s 
perception of similarity of things. It follows that, like similarity, iconicity is 
both subjective and metonymic. And if it is metonymic by defi nition, then it 
will naturally be a matter of degree, with the position on the scale depending 
on the number and extension of shared features. Indeed, we would intuitively 
agree that a photo of person X is more iconic than an impressionistic portrait 
of person X, but less iconic than X himself. Full iconicity would imply – as does 
logical equivalence – full identity: the most iconic image of person X is that 
person himself.
Moreover, as the iconic relationship between entities does not exist inde-
pendently of an intelligence perceiving the similarity, iconicity is inherently 
subjective. However, the principle seems diffi  cult to apply to the relationship 
between linguistic forms and linguistic meanings: linguists teach us that a nat-
ural language, defi ned as a system of signs serving the purposes of communi-
cation, cannot be subjective. How can this apparent paradox be resolved? Th e 
“objective” language would be a refl ection of the objective picture of the world 
(notice the structuring of the label: the noun ‘picture’ does not implicate either 
the creator or the owner of the picture). Such a picture would be general (i.e., 
it would constitute the common property of all people), and if the principles 
of iconicity were to hold, its signs would have to be non-conventional, i.e., be 
based on natural similarity between things “out there” in the world and the 
linguistic signs that refer to them. Th is, however, is clearly not the case. On the 
other hand, the entirely subjective picture of the world (which might be called 
“the worldview,” with the grammatical structure of the label implicating a par-
ticular observer) would indeed be the sum total of individual worldviews – 
individual perceptions of individually selected projection aspects of things. As 
an iconic refl ection of such a worldview, the language would have to be purely 
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conventional, as it would have to stem out of a multitude of individually per-
ceived, subjective relationships of similarity. Clearly, this is not the case either. 
Th e basic opposition between “the objective” and “the subjective”, funda-
mental for all cognitive science, translates into the long-going dispute on the 
character and the location of borderlines that separate semantics from prag-
matics. It is not our ambition at this point to resolve the opposing views taken 
by philosophers of language and linguists of varying persuasions. Steering the 
middle course marked out by cognitive linguistics means to assume that ico-
nicity relates not to things as they are in the world “out there,” but to things as 
they are perceived from a particular point of view. Th us in fact it involves not 
miming things themselves, but a specifi c way of looking at those things. But 
creating a system of signs, and linguistic signs in particular, requires changing 
the individual “I see what I see” into the general “I see what everybody sees.” 
Th erefore signs have to get the status of signs “by law,” i.e., due to a relevant 
convention. Conventions tend to unify the way of creating, and recognizing, 
images of things, and this principle holds for theories of visual perception (cf. 
Arnheim 1997 [1954]) as well as for semiotics (cf. Peirce 1977). In cognitive 
linguistics, it is refl ected in Langacker’s notion of generalized observer – the 
psychologically realistic version of Chomsky’s idealized speaker (cf. Langacker 
1991). In the process of diachronic development of language, with innovations 
changing into conventions and with conventions getting robust, Peirce’s icons, 
signs motivated by similarity (“a mere community in some quality,” Peirce 
1998: 56) change into symbols (“whose relation to their objects is an imputed 
character,” Peirce 1998: 56), with iconic features becoming impossible to trace. 
Once again, in linguistics the eff ect of this process is referred to as lost motiva-
tion (cf. e.g., Burling: online).
3. Refl ection on linguistic iconicity 
Since the time of de Saussure the assumption that the relationship between 
the form and the meaning of linguistic signs is arbitrary has been reigning 
supreme. Although it is admitted – in agreement with obvious linguistic facts 
– that some such signs and their designates indeed directly refl ect “a com-
munity in some quality,” manifestations of iconicity known as onomatopoeia 
(defi ned as “sound felt to be adequate to meaning”) was generally considered 
as marginal: a small set of exceptions to the general rule of arbitrariness. Dem-
onstrated mainly on the level of individual lexical items miming seemingly 
universal elements of reality – standard examples being the English ‘cuckoo’ 
vs. the Polish ‘kukułka,’ or the Polish ‘szeptać’ vs. the English ‘whisper’ vs. the 
French ‘chuchoter’ – even the onomatopoeias were considered only partially 
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iconic. With phonetic diff erentiation of cross-linguistic data resulting from 
diff erences in phonological systems of individual languages, the iconicity was 
questioned in view of discrepancies between languages. 
Predictably enough, post-Saussurean structuralist linguistics largely dis-
credited also the phenomenon of sound symbolism (phonaesthesia): pur-
ported association of certain sounds, or combinations of sounds, with certain 
meanings, like in the much quoted series of English words ‘slippery’, ‘slide’, 
‘slither’, ‘sloppy’, ‘slimy’, ‘sleazy’ apparently connected with the unpleasant sen-
sations of touching wet and greasy objects. Counterexamples (e.g., the adjec-
tive ‘slim’ or the verb ‘sleep’) raised doubt, as did, once again, cross-linguistic 
diff erences. 
Th e issue becomes more pertinent – and less banal – when the trivial prin-
ciple governing onomatopoeia and phonaestesia becomes extended to reveal 
meanings of names of things in the world as refl ections of conventionalized 
ways of looking at those things (from certain points of view, and thus refl ecting 
certain projection aspects). To use yet another standard example, those who 
fi rst named the table ‘table’ must have considered the fl at upper part (the Latin 
‘tabula’) as the most signifi cant feature of the object, considering it as being 
conceptually similar to a plank or board. And those who called an analogous 
object ‘stół’ might have selected as the most salient the legs on which the top 
rose, making the thing similar to a rise (PIE ‘*sta-’). Are these two names arbi-
trary or cognitively – iconically – motivated? 
Refuting the structuralist principle of arbitrariness of linguistic signs is not 
tantamount to yielding to what has been called the “natural language fallacy,” 
i.e., the assumption that “<nature> has established a real connection between 
signs and things they signify”(Fischer and Nänny 1999: xv). Th ere are many 
arguments for steering a middle course between the two extremes. Th ere is 
much to be said about iconicity as a property of the verbal code. Unlike in 
logic, there is an obvious tendency to adapt the properties of linguistic form to 
the properties of the linguistic function or the meaning of such forms. Before 
examples of diff erent types of iconicity are given below, it seems proper to state 
that two basic grammatical categories, which cognitive linguistics claims to be 
universal across natural languages of the world, are an iconic refl ection of the 
fundamental structure of the world as we know it. It is the most basic experi-
ence of the human body and mind confronted with the surrounding reality to 
perceive three dimensional objects (things, “nouns”) entering into mutual rela-
tionships (relations, “verbs”) within the three dimensional physical space. Ac-
cordingly, irrespective of typological diff erences, natural languages iconically 
refl ect that duality by employing two basic categories of signs, corresponding 
to what traditional grammars call nouns and verbs.
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4. Principles of iconicity at work
4.1. Quantity – systemic and contextual 
As is well known, in its simplest form the iconic principle of quantity can be 
summarized in the slogan “more form, more meaning.” Examples are eas-
ily found. For instance, on the level of phonology, there is the categorial op-
position which learners of English know as the opposition between strong 
(stressed) and weak (unstressed) forms of personal pronouns. While the 
strong form, as in:
(1) Please take HIM with you 
performs the functions of identifying the object and then making reference to 
it, the function of the weak form, as in:
(2) Please take him with you
is that of reference alone, following earlier identifi cation. Contrary to what 
Polish learners of English might believe, the same principle is used by Polish, 
which deletes the pronoun when identifi cation of the referent is ensured , as it 
had already been achieved by other contextual means, as in: 
(3) Nie wiem czy pamiętasz, co powiedzieli. 
 ‘[I] don’t know if [you] remember what [they] have said.’ 
or in French, where the coreferential anaphoric pronoun appears in the weak 
form, as in: 
(4) …. moi, je ne sais pas. 
 ‘As for myself, I don’t know.’ 
On the level of morphological structure, certain languages implement the 
iconic principle of quantity by using reduplication – either in the derivation, 
as in the Tok Pidgin word for ‘bicycle’, ‘wilwil’, where the repeated morpheme 
(from the English ‘wheel’) refl ects the physical construction of a bicycle, or 
in fl exion, with reduplication marking the plural number of nouns, as in the 
oppositions ‘pingan’ (‘dish’) vs. ‘pingpingan’ (‘dishes’) or ‘talon’ (‘fi eld’) vs. ‘tal-
talon’ (‘fi elds’) in Ilocano, one of the languages spoken in the Philippines. How-
ever, one should be careful not to make sweeping generalizations: as is the case 
with other devices and strategies, languages diff er as to the extent to which 
they employ iconicity, and the diff erences are seen both across languages and 
within particular systems. Th us, although even in those languages that do not 
use reduplication in fl exion the plural is regularly formed by adding an ending 
Elzbieta Tabakowska.
133
Principles of Iconicity and Linguistic Categories 
to the singular stem, the rule “the more objects of reference, the more form to 
refer to these objects” is easily undermined by counterexamples.
In reference to grammatical categories, the principle of iconic quantity 
helps to explain systemic phenomena that are otherwise diffi  cult to deal with. 
To quote just one example, the claim made by some linguists that excludes the 
category of middle voice from languages like Polish must be refuted when the 
diff erence between the weak form of the refl exive pronoun ‘się’ (‘oneself ’) is 
considered in opposition to the strong form ‘siebie’ (‘one’s own self ’). Th e two 
are sometimes classifi ed as a case of free variation. However, investigated with 
relation to iconicity, they prove to be cases of the quantity principle at work: 
used with transitive verbs, the weak form expresses the refl exive voice proper, 
or a single participant event, as in: 
(5) Nie widzę się w tej sukni. 
 ‘I don’t envisage myself wearing this dress.’
as opposed to the strong form, which implies a sort of “split personality,” or 
taking the point of view that enables casting the single participant of the event 
in two semantic roles (cf. Tabakowska 2003: 389), which is exemplifi ed by:
(6) Nie widzę siebie na tym zdjęciu. 
 ‘I do not see me in this picture.’ 
Th e principle “less form, less meaning” underlies most cases of grammat-
icalization, with lexemes or phrases losing part of their meaning and being 
reduced to grammatical markers. In the process they undergo phonetic reduc-
tion and lose semantic transparency. To quote a well known example from Pol-
ish, the particle ‘przecież’, which comes from the prepositional phrase ‘przed 
się’ (‘in front of oneself ’) and which in its contemporary form is used to draw 
attention to the speaker’s justifi cation of an earlier utterance or a general con-
text of the ongoing discourse, has lost direct reference to the iconic picture of 
the interlocutor putting the meaning of that utterance or that context “in front 
of themselves” in order to be able to inspect them more closely. 
Yet another manifestation of the iconic principle of quantity at work is the 
so-called politeness strategy: the length of an utterance is directly proportional 
to the metaphorically extended social distance between the speaker and the 
interlocutor. Th us, for instance the utterances (7) and (8) are more polite than 
the utterances (9) and (10), respectively:
(7) I wonder whether you might be willing… 
(8) Visitors are kindly requested to refrain from smoking in the corridors.
(9) Can you…?
(10) Don’t smoke in the corridors. 
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By the same token, in languages like Polish, which do not use length of sounds 
on the phonemic level, lengthening of vowels and/or sibilants signals empha-
sis, as in To trwało sstraszszsznie dłuuugo –‘it lasted for a terribly long time.’ 
Th e same strategies can appear in context dependent uses of language. Th e 
best known case is that of rhetorical repetition (structural parallelism), em-
ployed both in everyday communication, as in (11a) and its Polish counterpart 
in (11b):
(11) a. It is a very, very diffi  cult problem.
 b. To bardzo, bardzo trudne pytanie
and in more refi ned discourse, illustrated in (12):
(12) So are they all, all honourable men.
 …………………………………….
 But Brutus says he was ambitious;
 And Brutus is a honourable man. (Julius Caesar, III.ii) 
or, fi nally, to mark a series of diff ering projection aspects – a metaphor for 
showing an entity from diff erent points of view, as in:
(13) I swear by Almighty God that what I am about to say is the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth.
Sound symbolism, discredited as a systemic property of language, becomes 
manifest in creative uses that go beyond the limits of paranomasia: 
(14) People took pride in the peruque and the puff ed petticoat, in the land-
scaped park, in painted porcelain and the powdered pudendum (Nor-
man Davies, Europe. A History, 1996: 595). 
It might be sensibly claimed that the accumulation of the sound ‘p’ mimes 
the affl  uence and excess of rococo, which is the object of the description in 
(14). If, in addition, the idea of sound symbolism were to be taken seriously, it 
could further be claimed that the pejorative association of the sound iconically 
refl ects the narrator’s negative attitude towards the style (the supposition that 
is actually confi rmed by the verbal context of (14) and by the discussion of the 
symbolism of ‘p/f ’ in Wierzbicka’s (1991: 83) description of emotive interjec-
tions ‘fe’ in Polish and Russian, ‘phew’ in English, ‘feh’ in Yiddish). 
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4.2. Proximity
Th e formulation of the iconic principle of proximity goes back to Otto Be-
hagel’s First Law, which states that “das geistig Zusammengehörige auch eng 
zusammengestellt wird”: entities that are close in mind tend to be close in lin-
guistic expression (cf. Behagel 1932).
Examples of its systemic manifestations can be found on all levels of lin-
guistic structure. It underlies the creation (and subsequent conventionaliza-
tion) of blends, with phonetic (and graphic) changes following the reduction 
of conceptual distance, as in English ‘brunch’ and ‘motel,’ or Polish ‘żywopłot’ 
(‘hedge’, lit. living-fence) or ‘serwomechanizm’ (‘servomechanism’). On the 
level of syntax, the principle may be exemplifi ed by the so-called Dative Shift :
(15) a. He bought a dress for Mary.
 b. Kupił sukienkę dla Marysi.
implying that Mary has not (yet) got the dress, i.e., the two entities are (still) 
“far from each other,” as opposed to:
(16)  a. He bought Mary a dress.
 b. Kupił Marysi sukienkę.
which implies that the gift  had actually been passed on to the recipient. 
In actual use, the principle of proximity is at work when the order of adjec-
tives within nominal phrases suggests stronger or weaker bounds, Behagel’s 
Zusamenstellung, as in:
(17) a beautiful close fi tting emerald green silk dress
where “being made of silk” is an inherent property of the dress, while its beauty 
is only a matter of individual subjective judgment. 
4.3. Sequentiality
Th e principle of sequentiality is best known as ordo naturalis: the structur-
ing of an utterance that directly refl ects the ordering of things or relationships 
between things occurring in extralinguistic reality. Th e best known example, 
discussed in Jakobson’s seminal article on “the essence of language” (1965), 
is Julius Caesar’s famous ‘veni, vidi, vici.’ Aptly named experiential iconicity 
(Enkvist 1990), the same principle underlies adverb or adverbial fronting in 
sentences prototypically building up such text categories as cooking recipe, 
guidebook, or chronicle:
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(18) a. In a large pan, melt 3 oz butter.
 b. On the right, there is a sculpture by… 
 c. In 1795 the king and his court…
Th e principle itself is so strongly conventionalized that the coordinate con-
junction ‘and’ (as well as its counterparts in other languages), which in logic 
marks a symmetrical relation, is interpreted as ‘and then’:
(19) a. She got up and had her breakfast.
 b. She had her breakfast and got up. 
In actual context-bound language use sequentiality is the means to realize the 
pragmatic principle called me fi rst, whereby linguistic expressions referring to 
elements of reality are ordered so that those closest to the speaker come fi rst, 
as in the set expressions listed below:
(20) come and go; this and that; here and there
On the level of sentence and text structure the principle of sequentiality gov-
erns the ordering of constituent parts that corresponds to the emotional load; 
the emotional syntax (term from Lecercle 2000) requires that elements that are 
most “loaded” emotionally come fi rst, as in:
(21) Moi, madame, votre chien, si ça continue, ce n’est pas dans son cul a lui 
que je vais le mettre, le mien, de pied (Lecercle 2000: 391).
In literary narrative the principle is employed in the structuring of the text: the 
order of presentation of events in the narrative is by default understood by the 
readers as rendering directly the order in which the events actually happened 
in the represented world (cf. e.g., Paprotte 1988). 
5. Conclusions
Manifestations of iconicity are visible on all levels of language and linguistic 
structure – both as systemic properties and as conventionalized or innovative 
instances of context dependent language use. Iconicity at work can be discov-
ered everywhere – from phonetics to morpheme to text and discourse. Gram-
mar can be seen as embodiment of conventionalized iconicity. Even though 
diachronic development of languages shows that iconic motivation of linguis-
tic signs might have been more important at earlier stages than it is today, we 
can still trace iconic motivation more easily and more frequently than it might 
seem. But, in conclusion, a word of warning seems in order: ‘frequent’ does 
not mean ‘ubiquitous,’ and (probabilistic) principles are not (normative) rules. 
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It is quite oft en the case that iconic motivation becomes overridden by some 
structural or communicative factors, like when one chooses to give priority 
to economy over politeness, and instead of marking the social distance with 
a long chain of words says briefl y: Iconicity? Watch out!
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